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Summary 
Both theoretical and empirical studies have shown that democracy and corruption have 
substantial influence on environmental policy. In this paper, we empirically analyse 
whether both democracy and corruption are equally important determinants. When these 
variables are jointly included as explanatory variables, we find that corruption stands 
out as an important determinant of environmental policies, while democracy has a very 
limited impact. Further on, we discuss our results in the context of the Environmental 
Kuznets Curve literature. We argue that institutional disarray that plagues developing 
countries will make it problematic for them to have increasing environmental policy 
stringency combined with increasing incomes. Finally, and more optimistically, when 
we consider our results in the context of institutions and growth, we conclude that there 
is a possibility of reaching a double dividend. Reductions in corruption would induce 
both higher growth rates and stricter environmental policies. Thus, institutional 
improvement is an extremely valuable step in achieving sustainable development. 
 
Keywords: Corruption, Democracy, Development, Environmental policy, Institutions 
JEL Classification: H40, D73, Q56, Q58 
The authors are grateful to John Proops for comments on an earlier draft. All 
remaining errors are ours. The research has been funded by the Dutch National Science 
Foundation (NWO) under contract nr. 016.005.040. 











De Boelelaan 1087 
1081 HV, Amsterdam 
The Netherlands 
E-mail: lorenzo.pellegrini@ivm.falw.vu.nl   2 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The role of democracy in bringing welfare to the people has a long history as a subject for 
analysis. Plato argued on the deficits of democracy in The Republic, and John Stuart Mill (1859) 
reflected extensively on masses’ governments and welfare. The rise of environmental concerns 
directed attention to a specific link between democracy and welfare, that is, the role of democracy 
in societies’ dealing with environmental issues. A first wave of literature – in the late 1960s and 
1970s – was sceptical about the virtues of democracies with respect to environmental protection 
because of the link between democracy, market economies, and individual freedom (e.g. Ehrlich, 
1968, Hardin 1968, Heilbroner, 1974). But, following the poor environmental performance of 
Soviet economies and dictatorships established in Latin America, Asia and Africa, a new strand of 
literature has been calling for democracy as a way to promote both economic and environmental 
welfare (e.g. McCloskey, 1983, Payne, 1995). 
More recently, literature’s interest has shifted from democracy to the effects of corruption on 
environmental quality (Lopez and Mitra 2000, Fredriksson and Millimet 2001, Damania et al. 
2003). This interest followed the evident pillage of natural resources that took place in developing 
countries dominated by corrupt regimes. It also fits the increasing awareness of the negative 
effects of corruption on the economy and on the production and provision of public goods. Thanks 
to the increasing availability of indexes of institutional qualities over the last decades (both 
indexes for democracy and for corruption), there are now several empirical studies on the effects 
of democracy and corruption on environmental policy commitment and resource conservation. In 
general, these studies conclude that democracy is a significant positive and corruption a 
significant negative determinant of environmental protection. 
A problem with these studies is, however, that they focus on either democracy or corruption, 
and they do not test whether one of the two variables is more important as compared to the other. 
This is problematic since the two variables are highly correlated and, therefore, the individual 
estimation of their effects easily overemphasises the importance of each variable. In technical 
terms, the coefficients suffer from an overestimation bias. In this paper, we will test whether 
empirical evidence supports both democracy and corruption to be fundamental determinants of 
environmental policy when these two institutional variables are used simultaneously as 
explanatory variables. Alternatively, we may conclude that one of the two variables is the main 
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channel through which environmental policies are affected, while the other variable is of 
secondary importance. 
While most of the literature has been concerned with actual resource use – such as 
deforestation rates, ambient concentration of pollutants, and soil erosion – our focus is on political 
commitment to the environment. This slightly different scope, compared to the mainstream 
literature, has two advantages. First, actual resource use and environmental quality levels are 
affected by several factors such as climate conditions that are outside the control of policy-
makers. These outside causes are important but difficult to control for econometrically. By 
studying the link from institutional indexes to environmental policies, we expect to be less 
vulnerable to external disturbances. Second, the actual levels for environmental variables are often 
sluggish in adjustment to policies. They are affected by a history of development and present 
concerns for the environment will only have an effect on future resource levels. Focusing on 
environmental commitment as an intermediate variable can reveal more direct impacts of 
contemporary institutional quality. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the data sets used in the analysis. 
Section 3 presents a review of theoretical and empirical findings in previous studies on 
democracy, corruption and environmental protection and compares them with our empirical 
findings. Section 4 discusses our results in the context of the literature on economic development 
and the environment, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. THE DATA 
Tests of the interaction among institutions, economic development and public policies advanced 
when, since the early 1970’s, the Freedom House indexes of political freedoms and civil liberties
1  
and the indicators from Business Environmental Risk Intelligence first appeared. Data on 
institutions are obtained from sources that are used by companies to evaluate investment 
opportunities in foreign countries and cover aspects of the economic milieu that are considered 
important by the economic agents that make use of them: risk of expropriation, definition of 
property rights, contract enforceability, infrastructure quality, working of markets, bureaucratic 
efficiency, political and institutional stability, repudiation of contracts by government, and so 
forth. Another source of data on institutional settings are those dataset gathered by international 
                                                   
1 These are also known as the Gastil-indexes after Raymond Gastil who developed them. 
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institutions and policy advisors. For this paper, we use data on corruption perception, available 
since 1995, gathered by Transparency International.
2 An increase in the corruption index has the 
intuitive meaning of an increase in corruption
3. There are data, provided by Transparency 
International, for the earlier period 1980-1985, but these data are restricted to 41 countries. We 
have augmented the sample including 13 countries on which corruption data started to be 
available in 1997 and 1998
4. As we expected, the correlation between the sets of 1980-1985, 1997 
and the 1998 corruption perception indexes, is very high (about 85%). Furthermore, when we 
regressed the available data from 1980-1985 on the data from the 1997, and the 1998 samples, the 
constant and the coefficient are within the 95% confidence interval of 0 and 1, respectively. This 
finding confirms that the values of the corruption perception index from more recent surveys can 
be used, as an addition to the older set of indexes, without further transformation. We checked 
robustness of our statistical results with respect to the sample, and results are only slightly 
changed when we use the sample restricted to the older data. For the regressions where we used 
the environmental regulatory regime index, which refers to the year 2001, as a dependent variable, 
the corruption perception index refers to the year 1998. 
Our proxy for democracy levels is from the dataset Polity IV, produced by ICSR of the 
University of Maryland (Jaggers and Gurr, 1995). In our main analysis, we averaged the annual 
values over the period 1980-85 to assure a coherent framework when we use the corruption 
variable that refers to the same period. When we used the environmental regulatory regime index  
as a dependent variable, we averaged the democracy variable over the period 1986-95. Some 
authors, while running cross-country regressions, prefer the use of dummy variables for 
democracy that indicate low, medium, or high democracy (e.g. Hauge and Ellingsen, 1998 and 
Neumayer, 2002). The use of dummies reduces however the variability of the democracy index 
and, therefore, reduces the statistical significance of its coefficient. Not to reduce the significance 
of the democracy variable at an early stage of our analysis, we prefer the use of the continuous 
variable. 
As a test for robustness, we also use another index of democracy. Thus, we will check if our 
results depend on the definition of the democracy measure we have chosen. While the Polity IV 
                                                   
2 The data are available at http://www.transparency.org/ 
3 That is, we subtracted the original value of the index, as provided by Transparency International, from 10. 
4 Specifically, we used data of the corruption perception index 1997 for Uruguay, the index 1998 for Ghana, 
Iceland, Jamaica, Morocco, Malawi, Paraguay, Senegal, Tunisia, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe and the 
1980-85 for the rest of the sample. 
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dataset accounts for institutionalised democracy and is made up by experts’ evaluations, the index 
of democracy, developed by Vanhanen (2000), scores countries according to elections results and 
participation.
5 The index of democracy is made by the multiplication of two factors: one accounts 
for the level of competition at elections and the other to the level of turnout. Thus, democracies 
are countries where competition among political parties is high and a large share of the electorate 
is active. We note that this index is, methodologically and conceptually, very different from the 
one used in the main analysis, and thus we consider it proper for a robustness analysis. The index 
has been averaged over two periods of time consistently with the other democracy index. 
The data on environmental policy stringency we used are based on the reports that were self-
compiled by individual countries prior to the UN Earth Summit that took place in Rio in 1992. 
Dasgupta et al. (1995) first developed an index of environmental policy stringency based on the 
questionnaires collected by the UN Environmental Program. Their country sample included 31 
countries randomly chosen among the ones that participated in the conference. Eliste and 
Fredriksson (2002), using the same methodology, compiled the index for another 31 countries 
(also randomly selected). Together, these two sets make a sample of 62 countries with which it is 
possible to perform cross-country analysis. The index ranges from 1 to 250, with a lower value 
implying a less stringent policy. These data reflect several aspects of agricultural environmental 
policy: from policy formulation, to its implementation, to general awareness in the public of 
environmental issues. Their base year is 1990. The reports were completed by the governments, 
representatives of the business sector and of Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs) of the 
countries concerned. The presence of NGOs in the process should warrant objectiveness in the 
surveys and avoid complacency typical of governmental self-reporting. Also an index of industry 
stringency of environmental regulations is available, but only for 31 countries. The index for 
agriculture and the one for industry have a Pearson correlation of 0.96. As the indexes as so 
highly correlated, we can consider the agriculture one (which is available for a larger sample) as 
an indicator of overall environmental protection. 
Another index quantifying the stringency of environmental policies is the “environmental 
regulatory regime index” compiled by Esty and Porter (2002) on the base of the Environmental 
Sustainability Index
6, and the Global Competitiveness Report 2001-2002 annual survey of 
                                                   
5 The data are available at http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen/ 
6 The Environmental sustainability index is a joint project of the World Economic Forum, The Yale Center for 
Environmental Law and Policy, and the Columbia University Center for International Earth Science Information 
Network. See www.ciesin.columbia.edu/indicators/ESI/ 
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business and government leaders. The index includes the stringency of environmental pollution 
standards, sophistication of regulatory structure, quality of the environmental information 
available, extent of subsidization of natural resources, strictness of enforcement and quality of 
environmental institutions. Esty and Porter (2002) have shown that the index they compiled is a 
statistically significant predictor of pollution levels (the authors used it as an explanatory variable 
for urban particulate concentration, urban SO2 concentration, and energy usage). We will make 
use of this index, as an alternative to the environmental protection stringency index as to check the 
robustness of our results. It must be noted though, that countries for which the environmental 
regulatory regime index is available tend to be more democratic than the world average.
7 The 
presence of fewer autocracies in the sample could imply a sample bias. This bias could be 
explained by the fact that it is more difficult to collect data needed to construct the index in 
dictatorships and, as a result, we would expect the democracy variable to have less explanatory 
power in this sample. Therefore, the results of the democracy variables, when the environmental 
regulatory regime index is used as a dependent variable, should be interpreted with caution. 
The data on income are from the commonly used Summer and Heston database, specifically 
the Penn World Table 6.1 (income levels are adjusted taking into consideration purchasing power 
parity).
8 The urbanization variable (i.e. the percentage of the population living in urban areas) is 
from the Global Development Network Growth Database of the World Bank.
9 The schooling 
variable measures the average years of schooling in the population over 25 in the year 1985 and 
1995. Data are from the International Data on Educational Attainment (Barro and Lee)
10.  
3.  THEORETICAL HYPOTHESES AND THEIR EMPIRICAL TESTING 
Two different strands of literature have addressed the impact of democracy and corruption on 
environmental policy. These strands seem to have proceeded in parallel, independently. As a 
                                                                                                                                                               
 
7 The mean of the democracy variable (when scaled 0-10) for the years 1986-1995 is 7.07, 7.83 and 7.51 for the 
complete sample, for the countries for which the environmental regulatory regime index is available and for the 
countries for which the environmental policy stringency index is available, respectively. The standard deviations 
of the same democracy variable (in the same order) are: 3.09, 2.69 and 3.10. Therefore, the sample for which the 
environmental regulatory regime index has been compiled appears to have a higher mean value of the 
democracy variable and reduced variance. This could explain why, in the regression that have the environmental 
regulatory regime index as a dependent variable, the democracy variable tends to be non significant. 
8 Available at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ 
9 Available at http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/GDNdata.htm 
10 Available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/ciddata/ciddata.html 
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result, it is possible that each strand of literature have been overemphasising, theoretically and 
empirically, the importance of each separate variable.  
The effects of democracy on societies’ welfare have been the subject of philosophical debates 
for centuries. More recently, conservationist authors writing in the 1960s and 1970s have 
frequently called for a Hobbesian approach to environmental issues. To them, freedom needed to 
be constrained for the conservation of common goods in general, and of the environment 
specifically (Elrich, 1968, Hardin, 1968 and Heilbroner, 1974). The literature changed its view in 
the 1980s, after which most of the papers highlighted positive effects of democracy. This shift was 
possibly prompted by mounting evidence of the poor environmental performance that 
characterised the Soviet block and the dictatorships of Latin America, Africa and Asia. Figure 1 
portrays the relation between democracy and environmental policy in our sample. It clearly shows 
that, indeed, democracy is positively correlated with environmental policy stringency. After 1980, 
the common argument in favour of democracy connects democracy with citizens’ freedom, the 
availability of information on environmental degradation and the ability to protest against it. 
Moreover, it stresses responsiveness of democracies to citizens’ requests, the propensity of 
democracies to engage in international cooperation, and the coincidence of markets, as economic 
systems, with democracies (e.g. McCloskey, 1983 and Payne, 1995).
11 
As for the theory on democracy and environmental policy, an influential paper has been 
published by McGuire and Olson (1996). They analyse optimal behavior of an autocrat in 
providing public goods. In their model, an increase in the size of the elite would bring about a 
more efficient solution with higher levels of public goods. The size of the ruling class, which 
could be considered a measure of democracy, would positively affect the provision of public 
goods such as environmental quality. Deacon (1999) presents an adaptation of McGuire and 
Olson’s model and provides empirical results that support the interpretation of environmental 
quality as a public good, and that support a positive effect of democracy on environmental quality. 
Torras and Boyce (1998) also find evidence of the positive effect democracy has on the 
environmental quality when they estimate the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) for sulfur 
dioxide, smoke, heavy particles, dissolved oxygen, fecal coliform, availability of safe water, and 
sanitation. Harbaugh et al. (2002) confirm the results when they include a democracy index in 
                                                   
11 Other authors claim that both market oriented democracy and autocracies cannot solve in a satisfactory 
manner environmental issues (see Dryzek, 1987). 
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their estimate of the EKC; they find a consistent negative relation between sulfur dioxide and 
democracy levels. 
Others have studied the link from democracy to environmental policy, instead of targeting the 
environmental variables themselves. Congleton (1992) estimated the positive effect of democracy 
on the probability of signing the global convention on the reduction of emissions of ozone 
depleting substances.
12 Neumayer (2002) presents statistical evidence of the positive effect of 
democracy on the degree of environmental commitment of countries. He uses the probability of 
signing multilateral environmental agreements, participating in environmental intergovernmental 
organizations, the amount of countries’ area under protection, the presence of national councils on 
sustainable development, and the availability of environmentally relevant information as measures 
for environmental commitment.  
 
                                                   
12 The analysis studied the probability that countries signed the agreement by 1985 or 1987. Since most of the 
countries, democracies as well as non-democracies, have signed the convention nowadays, the results seems less 
valid if not to indicate the probability that democracies are faster to tackle environmental issues if compared to 
autocracies.  
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FIGURE  1. Scatter plot of the index of environmental policy stringency (vertical axis) and the 
democracy index (horizontal axis). 
















































On corruption and environmental policy, a large quantity of reports have been published that 
study the effect of corruption on environmental policy implementation. Carter (1997) studies the 
effects of crime and corruption on waste management and related health risks in the state of New 
York. The World Bank’s (1999) report on corruption and forestry emphasises the detrimental 
influence of corruption on forests’ management and conservation. Robbins (2000) introduces a 
theoretical framework for the analysis of corruption and then uses it to study the enforcement of 
protection for a natural reserve in Rajastan, India. Robbins finds that the lack of enforcement is 
fuelled by corruption among foresters and that such leads to substantial habitat destruction. 
FIGURE  2 presents a scatter plot showing the negative correlation between the environmental 
protection index and corruption levels for our data. 
Lopez and Mitra (2000) argued, in a theoretical paper, that corruption and environmental 
policy stringency are characterised by a monotonic (negative) relationship. They present two 
models in which the government is considered an agent that has a utility function with two 
components: the probability of being re-elected, and the direct transfers received by the lobbies of 
interest groups. The lobby transfers measure the level of corruption. Their results show that, in a 
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Nash equilibrium game or a non-cooperative Stackelberg model with the representative firm as a 
leader, corruption leads to a sub-optimal level of environmental protection. When possible, the 
firms will bribe the government to tolerate overexploitation of the natural resource. Fredriksson 
and Millimet (2001) elaborate on this result, but claim that there is a non-monotonic correlation 
between corruption levels and environmental protection. After a certain threshold of corruption, a 
further increase in corruption would yield an increase in the stringency of environmental policy. 
This result depends on assumptions about the bureaucrats and their constant number, which would 
imply that an increase in the number of corrupted bureaucrats decreases the face value of each 
bribe and, therefore, reduces the effects of corruption.
13 Damania (2002) shows that 
environmental regulations are ineffective with highly corrupted bureaucrats. He makes the case 
for a complete deregulation if there is no possibility to reduce corruption. 
















































                                                   
13 Fredriksson and Millimetet supported their finding with econometric data at state level for the USA, using as 
a proxy for corruption the number of civil servants on trial for crimes related to bribery as a share of the public 
employees. Such a proxy has the obvious shortcoming that it can be the case that it reflects judiciary efficiency 
and that trials come after crimes have been committed. Therefore, judiciary initiatives can be a symptom of an 
anticorruption campaign. Therefore, an increase in trials and sentences for corruption can coincide with an actual 
decrease of corrupted behaviours.  
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FIGURE 2. Scatterplot of the index of environmental policy stringency (vertical axis) and the corruption 
index (horizontal axis).  
 
In short, both theoretical and empirical research support the conclusion that institutional 
settings affect the way policy makers respond to environmental concerns, and that corruption and 
democracy are two important variables in the process. However, both strands of literature 
potentially suffer from the problem of biased coefficients because of omitted variable.
14 In our 
sample, the correlation between the corruption and democracy variable is –0.68, statistically 
significant at 1%; thus a high level of democracy corresponds a low level of corruption. In case 
one of the two variables is the actual cause of loose environmental policies, a statistical analysis 
with the other variable as independent variable can easily produce a significant coefficient for that 
variable. It is worthwhile noticing that there is a lack of evidence of a causal relationship between 
these two variables. That is, contemporary levels of democracy seem not to affect corruption 
levels and vice-versa (Treisman, 2000). Therefore, even though correlated, these variables can be 
considered exogenous in the analysis. Furthermore, while many institutional quality variables tend 
to be related conceptually and statistically without exceptions (e.g. rule of the law and lack of 
corruption), there are a number of countries that show high levels of corruption but are 
democracies and there are autocracies with low corruption levels. An example of the former is 
Italy, which has a history of 50 years of democracy and unusually high levels of corruption for its 
development stage. An example of the latter is Singapore, which is not a liberal democracy but 
has very little corruption.
 15 
For our statistical analysis, we estimate, with ordinary least squared, on a cross-section of 
countries the following equation: 
 
ii i i
0 1 80 2 3 4 EPS = + ln(Y )+ Corr + Demo + Z + αα α α α ε
i i





14 More technically, if the real relation among three variables is given by  , the two 
independent variables are correlated (so that  ) and we omit variable X3; then in a 
regression we will find  . Therefore, the estimation bias of the 
coefficient of the included variable X2 will be equal to  . 
12 23 3 yX X ββ β =+ + +
X u
312 2 XX γγ ε =+ +
23 2 2 () ββ γ ε + + +
32 βγ
13 1 y ββ γ =+ +
15 The democracy score of Singapore in 2001 (from Polity IV) was 4 and the corruption perception index was 
0.8 (both indexes are on a 0-10 scale). In the same year Italy had a democracy score of 10 and a corruption score 
of 4.8. 
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where the superscript i denotes each country in the sample, EPS is the Environmental Protection 
Stringency Index, Y80 is income per capita, Corr is the Corruption Perception Index that refers to 
the period 1980-85, Demo is the index of democracy and also refers to the period 1980-85. 
Finally, Z is a vector of control variables that are used to check the robustness of our findings. 
Before discussing the findings, we note that institutional indexes are difficult to estimate with a 
high degree of precision and that their coefficients will presumably suffer a downward bias due to 
measurement error. 
The results of the regressions of equation (1) are reported in Table 1. The results are reported 
in standardised form for ease of interpretation: the coefficients can be interpreted in standard 
deviation terms. In other words, a coefficient of one implies that one standard deviation of the 
independent variable is associated with a one standard deviation of the dependent variable. When 
we will use dependent variables that have different scale (i.e. the environmental protection 
stringency index and the environmental regulatory regime index) the standardised form makes the 
coefficients more easily comparable. The first two columns take into consideration the two 
institutional variables separately and produce the standard findings. Both variables seem to have a 
great influence on the environmental policy stringency index: democracy a positive influence and 
corruption a negative one. In column entry (1), the democracy index has a positive coefficient of 
0.34, significant at the 1% level. A one standard deviation increase in the democracy variable 
induces an increase in the environmental protection index by approximately one third of its 
standard deviation. In column entry (2), the corruption index has a coefficient equal to –0.56 and 
is statistically significant at a 1% level of confidence. We find that an increase of one standard 
deviation in the corruption index reduces the environmental protection index by more than half its 
standard deviation. Though both variables are, individually, significant and contribute 
substantially to the environmental policy stringency, when compared to each other, corruption 
seems to be the most powerful explanatory variable. Also, the adjusted R
2 increases from 0.69 to 
0.76 when going from the first to the second column entry. 
In regression (3), both variables are included jointly, and we see that the value of both the 
coefficients decreases (in absolute value) and the statistical significance of the coefficient on 
democracy is reduced to a 5% level
16. This result again confirms the corruption index as the 
variable with higher explanatory power. 
                                                   
16 As a method to check for the possibility of clustering independent variables (maintaining their explanatory 
power) and discovering possible composed variables, we have tried to use the principal component method 
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Subsequently, we carried out a series of robustness checks. First, a series of control variables 
have been added to the list of the regressors in order to check for the robustness of the coefficients 
of the independent variables. The first control variable is the percentage of the population living in 
urban areas. Urbanization rates have been found to influence corruption (Hill, 2003) and could 
also reflect different attitudes towards the environment.
17 We find, in regression (4), that the 
inclusion of the urbanization variable further decreases the size and statistical significance of the 
democracy variable (now it is equal to 0.12). At the same time, the coefficient of corruption still 
retains economic and statistical significance. Moreover, we find that urbanization is a significant 
determinant of environmental policy stringency and has a negative effect. That is, for given 
income, democracy, and corruption levels, the more the people live in urban areas the less 
stringent environmental policy tends to be. This result, on the effect of urbanization, is not very 
strong, as it is sensitive to the inclusion of additional control variables and in the following 
regressions its coefficient tends to decrease in size and significance.  
The second control variable we added is schooling, reported in column entry (5). We find the 
coefficient of the democracy variable to remain insignificant. There is a decrease in the absolute 
value of the corruption coefficient to –0.44, though it remains significant at 1% confidence level. 
The schooling variable itself is highly significant. A one standard deviation increase in schooling 
increases environmental policy stringency by approximately a third of one standard deviation. 
This is what we expected on theoretical grounds as improved education leads to an increased 
awareness of environmental problems, such as health problems related to pollution. Last, we 
notice that the coefficient on the income variable drops to 5%. There is an obvious 
multicollinearity and causality problem between schooling and income and it appears difficult to 
single out the effects of education from the effects of income.
18 Another control variable added to 
the list but not reported in the table, has been the share of the population employed in agriculture. 
We found the coefficient of the agriculture variable to have almost no effect on the other 
coefficients and the coefficient for agriculture itself was insignificant both statistically and in 
magnitude (this result would hold even omitting the urbanization variable). 
                                                                                                                                                               
adding other institutional quality indexes. The results did not allow for any meaningful grouping of these 
variables and confirmed our impression on the independent role played by the corruption variable. 
17 Urbanization rates are typically included in EKC estimations. In our analysis, the coefficient on the 
urbanization variable can be interpreted as reflecting differences in preferences and in political influence of 
urban and non-urban citizens. 
18 As some authors have argued that corruption levels affect public investment in education (e.g. Mauro, 1998, 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh, 2004) the inclusion of the schooling variable can be considered an extreme test for the 
significance of the corruption coefficient. 
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In the last step, of adding control variables, regional dummies have been included. These 
regional dummies have been found significant in many recent empirical analyses. Adding them to 
our analysis makes sure that our results are not driven by geographical factors or by a particular 
group of countries (e.g. see Rodriguez and Rodrik, 2000). In regression (6), after the inclusion of 
regional dummy variables
19, the magnitude of the democracy variable is further decreased and 
remains non-significant. At the same time, the corruption coefficient is robust to the inclusion of 
regional dummies. The regional dummies for Latin America and for OECD countries are the only 
significant ones (at 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively), which would indicate that 
there are some characteristics of Latin American countries and OECD that are affecting their level 
of environmental protection, and that are omitted from our model.  
Furthermore, in the literature it is sometimes suggested that the effect of corruption on 
environmental policy is non-monotonic (Fredriksson and Millimet, 2001). In order to check for 
non-linearities, we have carried out the simple regression from equation (2), omitting the 
democracy index and the control variables, but including the corruption variable at three powers. 
The results (not reported in the table) provide no evidence for a non-monotonic relation. The 
coefficients for the first and the second power are both insignificant, and the one at the third 
power is significant just at 10%.  
Another robustness check we performed was an analysis of the outliers. The environmental 
policy stringency index of Turkey and Iceland lays outside the 2 standard deviations of the 
residual bound from their predicted values. To be sure our results are not driven just by these two 
cases we repeated the analysis excluding them from the sample. We found that the exclusion of 
these two countries would slightly strengthen our conclusions as repeating regression (6) we find 
that the coefficient of democracy remains insignificant and equals 0.068. At the same time, the 
coefficient of the corruption index remains significant at 1% level and equals –0.33. 
As a third robustness check, we tested the robustness of our results with respect to the 
specification of the democracy variable, we use a measure of democracy that is rather different in 
its concept: the index of democracy, developed by Vanhanen (2000). The results (reported in he 
Appendix) with this different democracy variable confirm the findings presented above. When the 
democracy index is used individually (as in regression (2)) it appears to be a fundamental 
determinant of environmental policy. An increase of one standard deviation in the index of 
                                                   
19 The other regional dummies (Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia) that where found not to be significant are 
omitted). 
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democracy would increase the environmental protection index by more than half a standard 
deviation. After the inclusion of the corruption index (as in regression (3)), the importance of 
democracy is markedly decreased. The effects of democracy disappear both statistically and in 
magnitude once other variables are included. At the same time, size and statistical significance of 
corruption’s index coefficients are only slightly affected by the change in the measure of 
democracy. In regression (14), analogue to regression (6), it is equal to –0.33. 
Finally, the results presented above were confirmed also by the fourth robustness check: the 
use of the environmental regulatory regime index, replacing the environmental policy stringency 
index as a dependent variable. The environmental regime index was created by Esty and Porter 
(2002) ten years after the environmental policy stringency index was compiled. As noted in 
Section 2, the methodology used for building the two indexes is very different and we consider 
such a different dependent variable as a strong test of our results. Moreover, Esty and Porter 
(2002) have shown that the index they created is a significant determinant of environmental 
quality. Once the environmental regulatory regime index is used as a dependent variable, we find 
that corruption and income have by themselves the most of the explanatory power. While the 
democracy variable has a positive simple correlation with the environmental regulatory regime 
index, the inclusion of income as a control variable makes its coefficient to fall below zero and to 
be statistically non-significant. 
 
TABLE 1. Results from statistical analysis as in equation (1). 
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Independent (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Variables  EPS EPS EPS EPS EPS EPS 
LnY1980 0.56***   
(5.23)      
0.38*** 
(3.67)     
0.29*** 
(2.75)     
0.64*** 
(4.32)     
0.42**  
(2.62)     
0.20      
(1.34)     
Democracy  0.34***  
    (3.19)        
0.19**  
(2.01)     
0.12      
(1.28)     
0.13       
(1.44)     
0.10       




(–5.50)      
–0.49*** 
(–4.66)     
–0.53*** 
(–5.39)     
–0.44*** 
(–4.59)     
      –0.31*** 
(–3.59)     
Urbanization 
    
–0.38*** 
(–3.13)     
–0.38*** 
(–3.46)     
–0.20*     
(–1.86)     
Schooling 
     
0.34*** 
(3.17)     
0.32*** 
(3.44)      
Dummy for Latin 
America       
  –0.13*     
(–1.68)     
Dummy for OECD 
 
     
  0.25**   
(2.16)      
Adjusted R
2     0.69    0.76       0.77       0.81       0.84     0.88 
Number of cases  54    54      54   54   51   51    
OLS estimation with the Environmental Policy Stringency Index as dependent variable. Coefficients are 
standardised. Superscripts *, **,  *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance, respectively. t-statistics are in 
parenthesis under the coefficients. 
 
In summary, our results suggest that institutional settings are important determinants of 
environmental policy stringency. But, we find no robust support for a significant effect of 
democracy, while we find robust evidence for a substantial effect of corruption on environmental 
stringency. It seems likely that previous empirical works have been overemphasising the role of 
democracy for environmental policies and for environmental quality because of the omission of a 
corruption index as a control variable. In other words, our estimates suggest that increasing 
democracy levels have to be matched with reduced corruption to induce stricter environmental 
policy and that democracy per se will be insufficient. 
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3.1. THE CASE FOR DEMOCRACY TO INTERACT WITH INCOME 
Though the regressions presented above did not suggest a significant role for democracy, a further 
examination revealed a potential interaction between democracy and income. Specifically, we 
checked whether there could be an interaction among our institutional variables and income 
levels. The theory underlying such empirical analysis is that higher income races demand for 
stricter environmental protection, and only then require responsive (democratic or non-corrupt) 
policy makers. Another, complementary, explanation is that democratic polities may demand (and 
obtain) increases in environmental protection only when their income riches high levels and their 
more basic needs are fulfilled. If environmental policy depends on the interaction between income 
levels and institutional variables, introducing interaction terms should reveal this, by producing 
sizable and statistically significant coefficients. 
Indeed, in our analysis, we found some (weak) evidence for an interaction effect between 
income and democracy. That is, environmental policies tend to be stricter at high-income levels 
when the country is a well-established democracy, or stated otherwise, the effect of democracy 
more positive for higher income levels. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 2. 
Caution is needed though, because in contrast with the main results presented above, the result of 
the interaction variable is not confirmed by our robustness analysis. In regression (7) the 
interaction term is significant at 5%. The use of the index of democracy (as an alternative to the 
democracy variable from the Polity IV dataset), in column entry (8), produces statistically non-
significant coefficients. Also the use of the environmental regulatory index, as a dependent 
variable, weakly confirms the existence of an interaction between democracy and income levels, 
but only when the democracy variable is from the Polity IV dataset. In regression (10), where the 
environmental regulatory regime index is used as a dependent variable, the interaction term is 
significant at 10%. Furthermore, as variables have been standardised to a zero mean, the negative 
coefficient for democracy suggests that an increase in democracy negatively affects the 
environmental policy stringency for a country with average income level. Only when income is 
above one standard deviation of the average income, democracy starts to have a positive effect. 
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lnY  0.06      
(0.35)     
0.20      
(1.44)    
0.12     
(0.43)    
0.07      
(0.39)     
Democracy  –1.35*     
(1.98)       
–0.52      
(0.65)      
Index of Democracy 
 
–1.01      
(1.02)     
  –2.01*     




(2.57)    
–0.29*** 
(3.52)     
–0.61*** 
(5.42)     
–0.58*** 
(5.17)     
Urbanization  –0.18*    
(1.73)    
–0.27*** 
(2.74)     
0.09      
(0.94)     
0.10      
(1.01)     
Schooling  0.28*** 
(3.01)     
0.31*** 
(3.42)     
–0.07      
(0.60)     
–0.03       
(0.28)     
Dummy for Latin America  –0.13*    
(1.84)    
–0.09      
(1.26)    
–0.13      
(1.37)     
–0.12       
(1.47)     
Dummy for OECD  0.13      
(1.02)    
0.16     
(1.34)   
–0.01      
(0.09)     
–0.07       
(0.60)     
Democracy x lnY  1.72**  
(2.15)      
0.59      
(0.59)       
Index of Democracy x lnY 
 
1.27    
(1.22)   
  2.20*     
(1.91)     
N                  51                   51             53                 52 
Adjusted R
2                    0.89                    0.89               0.82                   0.83 
OLS estimation with the Environmental Policy Stringency Index as dependent variable. Coefficients are 
standardised. Superscripts *, **,  *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance, respectively. t statistics are in 
parenthesis under the coefficients. 
 
Thus, we find the interaction term between democracy and income statistically significant at 
5 % in just in one of four possible specifications of our econometric model (and in the robustness 
checks with the same time frame and additional variables). As such we do not find the evidence as 
particularly compelling for the case of an interaction among democracy and income and we report 
the tentative evidence as it stands mainly as a possible qualification of our main results about the 
limited influence of democracy as a determinant of environmental policy stringency.  
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4. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE 
In this section we interpret our results in the context of the literature on economic development 
and the environment, and emphasise how our findings relate to the EKC and the leapfrogging 
hypothesis (i.e. the possibility that developing countries could tunnel through the EKC). At the 
end of this section, while referring to the literature on institutions and economic development, we 
will address the issue of sustainable development.  
Several authors have argued that currently developed countries first experienced a decrease in 
environmental quality, due to increased production and increased pollution levels, but then 
experienced an improvement of several indicators of ambient quality as their income further 
increased (e.g. Grossman and Krueger, 1995). In the later stage of development, cleaner 
production techniques and the decrease in the share of polluting goods allowed for a decrease in 
pollution while there was an increase in the scale of the economy. Hopefully, currently developing 
countries will follow a similar path and show increasing environmental quality hand in hand with 
increasing income levels. Even more optimistically, some authors hope that developing countries 
will “leapfrog” the pollution intensive part of their development path, i.e. they will tunnel through 
the EKC. According to this strand of literature, developing countries may benefit from 
experiences in developed countries, both in terms of clean technologies developed, but also in 
terms of effective and efficient environmental policies. Moreover, developing countries may step 
over the stage of “command and control” policies and go directly to more sophisticated and more 
efficient regulations (e.g. Perkins, 2003). 
Our estimates of the effects of income on environmental policy confirm the positive effect of 
higher income for environmental protection. But as a qualification of this hopeful perspective, let 
us first note that, even assuming that the EKC pattern can be reproduced in developing countries 
in a similar manner as in currently developed countries, still developing countries will face 
declining environmental quality for several decades. Cole and Neumayer (2004) estimate that, on 
basis of optimistic forecasts on both economic growth and the effects of income levels on the 
environment, for a number of pollutants, ambient concentrations will continue to increase for the 
next century in many developing countries.
20 Adding to the problem is the global shift in 
comparative advantages. Developed countries achieve cleaner production technologies but also 
                                                   
20 It must be noted that the turning points of the EKC used for the analysis of Cole and Neumayer (2004) are 
deemed to be overly optimistic given the most recent studies (e.g. Harbaugh et al. 2002, Stern, 2003), which 
made use of more complete dataset and improved estimation techniques if compared to the benchmark works of 
Grossman and Kreguer (1995) and to the more recent work of Cole (2003). 
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move their production structure to sectors associated with lower pollution levels, thus developing 
countries will find their comparative advantage to shift to the more polluting production sectors. 
The most important objection to the copying of past EKC’s to the future of present developing 
countries we find in the effects of institutions on environmental policies, studied in this paper. Our 
results portray a somewhat pessimistic perspective on the future environmental quality in 
developing countries. One of the explanations for the EKC is an assumed institutions’ policy 
response in reaction to increasing scarcity of the environmental goods and shifting preferences of 
the people (Grossman and Krueger, 1995). Since lower quality institutions typically plague 
developing countries,
21 in these countries we expect less of a policy response to changing 
preferences. Therefore, even when reaching similar income levels as the currently developed 
countries, developing countries can be expected to have laxer environmental policy. From this 
point of view, there is reason to believe that for developing countries the EKC’s apex shifts to the 
right and will move upward, and will not resemble the developed countries’ EKC. In this 
perspective, tunnelling through the EKC seems improbable. The policy response towards efficient 
and effective environmental regulation is dubious in countries affected by chronic corruption 
(Damania 2002). 
We can also turn towards a more optimistic perspective, using the same empirical results of the 
previous section. Improving a country’s institutional quality may render a double dividend when it 
will be beneficial for environmental quality, as well as for economic growth, thus improving 
societal welfare two times. Barro (1996) argues that for low levels of democracy an increase in 
democracy will foster economic development. At the same time, evidence strongly suggests that 
corruption has negative effects on economic development (Mauro, 1995; Mo, 2001). When a 
decrease in corruption levels leads to cumulating high growth rates, environmental policy will 
improve through both the direct channel (analysed in this study) and the indirect income channel. 
Moreover, the positive interaction effect of democracy and income on environmental stringency 
found in Section 3.1 suggests that the two channels will further strengthen each other. Our results 
therefore support the emphasis that has been put on improving the institutional infrastructures of 
developing countries (e.g. Meier, 2001), stressing the fact that such institutional improvement 
could be functional not only to economic growth, but also to undertaking a sustainable growth 
path. 
                                                   
21 In our sample the average value of the corruption index was 7.14 for countries with income below 2,000 USD 
in 1980, and 1.66 for the countries with income above 20,000 USD. 
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Also, let us recognize that countries can learn from each other when developing environmental 
policies. Whether, for a certain country, economic growth can be decoupled from environmental 
pressure, will also depend on the availability and price of new technologies, and on the role 
played by international actors in shaping national environmental policies. Clean production 
techniques adopted in developed countries diffuse and are available for developing countries. 
Also, international organization such as the IMF and the World Bank now recognize the 
environment as an issue of development and increasing pressure is put on governments to act 
domestically and to sign international environmental agreements.
22 The attention is also visible in 
trade agreements such as the North America Free Trade Agreement that pays attention to 
environmental legislation. The European Union provides a remarkable example of the importance 
that the international arena has for domestic environmental policies. It sets ambient quality 
standards for member countries and, more or less, forces its recent new members to take a 
shortcut for the EKC.  
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
Our analysis, in line with previous literature, shows statistically significant and sizeable 
coefficients when democracy and corruption are considered individually as explanatory variables 
for environmental policy stringency; negative for corruption and positive for democracy. 
Contributing to the literature, we have shown that the inclusion of corruption and democracy 
together diminishes the significance and importance of the democracy variable. The further 
inclusion of additional control variables renders the democracy variable statistically insignificant 
and the magnitude of the coefficient is markedly further decreased. We deduct from our results 
that a large part of the positive effect of democracy on environmental protection, as it is found in 
most of the previous studies, is due to the correlation between high levels of democracy and less 
corruption. 
Though, caution is warranted, since democracy and corruption are highly correlated; there may 
be a problem of multicollinearity, which may have decreased the statistical significance of 
democracy’s coefficient. We also must recognise the possible existence of a causal link from 
democracy to corruption that could give further scope for democracy to influence environmental 
                                                   
22 Data from the Environmental Treaties and Resource Indicators (available at 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri) confirm an increasing trend in the number of environmental treaties over 
time: 70 in the decade 1960-70, 94 in the decade 1970-80, 89 in the decade 1980-90 and 110 for 1990-2000. 
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policy indirectly. Thus, if democracy were a determinant of corruption, part of its effect on 
environmental policy would be taken up by the corruption variable. Treisman (2000) estimated 
the effect of democracy on corruption. While he found that current levels of democracy do not 
affect corruption, a long exposure to democracy (more than 40 years) predicts lower corruption. 
Thus, our results would hold well in a short-medium time framework, but democracy would gain 
importance in a long time horizon. In summary, we find no evidence of a sizeable and significant 
positive effect of democracy on environmental policy, other than possibly through corruption or 
through some other independent variables considered in the analysis (e.g. schooling). 
Our results do not present and optimistic perspective on environmental policies in developing 
countries. Developing countries typically suffer from lower levels of institutional qualities, which 
tend to persist over time; this is also considered as one of their major impediment to economic 
growth. Given the low institutional quality, these countries will have less stringent environmental 
policies than the developed countries had when they had a similar income level. The evidence 
presented here suggests that an increase in institutions soundness might provide a double dividend 
of higher income growth rates and higher levels of environmental protection. In other words, 
improvement in the institutional environments would be, especially for developing countries, the 
prime objective towards a sustainable development growth path. 
 
APPENDIX  
In Table 3, as a sensitivity test, we reproduce the main results using alternative indexes for the 
stringency of the environmental policy and for the level of democracy. With the respect of the 
former, we use the environmental regulatory regime index as an alternative to the environmental 
policy stringency index. With the respect of the latter, we use the index of democracy instead of 
the democracy variable (for a detailed description of the indexes see above at Section 2).  




0 1 90 2 3 4 ERRI = + ln(Y )+ Corr + Demo + Z + ββ β β β ε
i i ,   (2) 
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where, ERRI is the environmental regulatory regime index, Y90 is income in 1990, Corr is the 
corruption perception index in 1998, Demo is the democracy index averaged for 1986-1995 and Z 
is a vector of control variables (referring to the year 1995). 
Using these alternative variables, we confirm that corruption is an important determinant of 
environmental policies: there are consistently sizeable and statistically significant negative 
coefficients on the corruption variable in the various specifications. At the same time, we find 
limited support for the effect of democracy on environmental policies. In some specifications –
when the environmental regulatory regime index is used as a dependent variable and corruption as 
an additional independent variable- the two democracy indexes assume even a negative coefficient 
(which is never significant). 
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TABLE 3. Results from statistical analysis as in equation (1) and (2). 
   (11)                  (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
 Independent  Variables                    EPS EPS EPS EPS ERRI ERRI ERRI ERRI ERRI
LnY  0.41*** 
(3.80)     
0.38*** 
(3.67)     
0.21**   
(2.01)     
0.28*   
(1.99)   
0.85*** 
(8.54)     
0.26*** 
(2.88)     
0.31*** 
(3.15)     
0.82*** 
(6.62)     
0.29**  
(2.53)    
Democracy 
      
  
        
        
        
        
        
 
–0.07       
(0.66)     
 
–0.09       
(1.26)     
Index of Democracy  0.52*** 
(4.81)    
 
0.35*** 
(3.52)     
0.15     
(1.46)    
 
0.02      
(0.12)     
–0.03      




(5.50)     
–0.43*** 
(4.29)     
–0.33*** 
(4.19)     
 
–0.69*** 
(7.76)     
–0.70*** 
(7.84)    
 
–0.68*** 
(7.21)     
Urbanization 
 
–0.26**   




(3.57)     
Dummy for Latin America 
 
–0.10       
(1.48)     
Dummy for OECD 
 
0.18      
(1.52)     
Dummy for South Asia 
 
0.10*     
(1.82)      
Adjusted R
2  0.74        0.76       0.81      0.89         0.64       0.83       0.83        0.68       0.83       
Number of cases  54             54            54          54              60           60            60             58            58            
OLS estimation, Regressions (1)-(4) have the environmental protection stringency as a dependent variable, Regressions (5)-(8) have the environmental regulatory regime index as 
a dependent variable. Coefficients are standardised. Superscripts *, **,  *** correspond to a 10, 5, 1% of significance, respectively. t statistics are in parenthesis under the 
coefficients.  25 
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